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Judge Baker was unwilling to be bound by an arbitrary test and insisted, as he usually did, on considering existing conditions that he
and his brethren on the federal bench in Indiana sustained a wartime
state regulation of coal prices. 1'
M. S. BRECKENRIDGE.
ADMISSIBILITY OF CONFIDENTIAL CONFESSION TO SPIRITUAL

ADVISER

The case of State v. Alma Petty Gatlin, tried before Judge
Cameron McRae at a Special Term of the Superior Court of Rockingham County last February, aroused the interest of the public
generally by its sensationalism; it is of peculiar interest to the profession-for the first iime in North Carolina the question of the
admissibility of a confidential confession as evidence was squarely
raised. The case itself will not go before the Supreme Court; Mrs.
Gatlin was acquitted. The question, therefore, remains unsettled.
There is one point to be borne in mind in considering these cases;
whether the minister may be compelled to testify is quite a different
question from whether the matter secured from the confidential confession is admissable as evidence.
HISTORY OF THE QUESTION

Is a confidential comunication to a minister, priest or spiritual
adviser admissible as evidence? The question is, at least, as old as
the Roman Law of an early period. In Rome not only were such
communications excepted from evidence, but the priest who revealed
them was punished, even where he had sworn not to reveal the information. The theory was that the communication passed through
"Am. Coal Mining Co. v. Special Comn., 268 Fed. 563 (D. Ind. 1920), ap-

peal dismissed on company's motion, 258 U. S. 632, 42 S. Ct. 273. See notes
19 Mich. L. Rev. 74, 415; Simpson, "Due Process and Coal Price Regulation,"
9 Iowa L. Bull. 145 (1924); People v. United Mine Workers, 201 Pac. 55
(Colo., 1921). Even by this broad rule there would be no foundation for general price regulation such as attempted but overthrown in Montana. Holter
Hdwe. Co. v. Boyle, 263 Fed. 134 (D. Mont., 1920). See Slate v.Goldstein,
93 So. 308 (Ala. App., 1922); Territory v.McCandless,24Hawaii, 485 (1918).
And it is hard to see what caused the United States Supreme Court in one
case to permit an inference of approving state regulation of laundry rates.
Okla. Operating Co. v.Love, 252 U. S.331, 40 Sup. Ct. 338 (1920). Rent
regulation was sustained as an emergency measure during the war. Block v.
Hirsh, 256 U. S.135, 41 Sup. Ct. 158 (1921) ; Chastleton Corp. v.Sinclair, 264
U. S.543, 44 Sup. Ct. 405 (1924); cf. State v.R. R. Coun., 183 N. W. 687
(1921) wherein the Wisconsin Act was held invalid because of being applicable
only to Milwaukee; Rumbo v. Winterroud, 228 S.W. 258 (Tex. Civ. App.,
1921) holding invalid statute which prohibifed farm landlord taking more than
certain percent of produce as rent.

NOTES
the representative to the principal, God, and that the priest could
lawfully and rightfully swear that he knew nothing of it.' During
the Middle Ages the laws on the Continent prohibited the priest from
revealing such confessions; especially are the Capitularies of the
French kings to be noted here.2 In England, however, in the days
of King Ethelred the law seemed to recognize no distinction between
laymen and clergymen ;3 probably the effect of early Roman Law in
England had worn off and the strong Roman Catholic movement had
not yet begun. In those days the rising monarchy was reflecting in
the laws its growing power, and it was probably due to this fact
that, in the case of high treason, if we may rely upon early dicta, the
courts first mentioned a rule denying the privilege and upholding the
admissibility of confidential confessions as evidence.4 However, we
can speak with no certainty of the state of the law before the Reformation. 5 Even after the Reformation cases in point are rare, but
dicta upon the subject become more frequent.0 By 1802, in a case
squarely in point, the court felt so sure of the ground that it began
the decision with these words, "There is no difficulty in this case
.
.
."17
By 1860 a priest had been fined for contempt because of
his refusal to testify as to a confession ;8 this decision seems to have
'Mascardus, De Probat.,Vol. I, Quaest. 5, n.61 [also see Greenleaf, Evidence, Vol I, sect. 247 (13th edition)].
' Capit. Reg. Francorum, lib. 7, paragraph 118; Leges Barbar.Antiq., Vol.
III,3 pp. 313, 316.
Ancient Laws and Institutes of England, Vol. 1, p. 347; Peake, Evidence,
Am. from the 5th London edition, p. 253; Best, Evidence, paragraph 583, 584.
' Note to Reg. v. Hay, 2 Fost. & F. (Eng.) 4 (1860).
'Garnett's Trial, 2 How. St. Tr. 218, 255 (1606). The famous Gunpowder
Plot Case is the one here cited; Garnett was implicated,-and executed. Apparently, all that could be found against the Jesuit priest was that he refused
to tell confessions made to him.
'Anon., 2 Skinner, 404 per Holt, C. J. (1693) ; Du Barre v. Livette, Peake's
Case 77, citing Reg. v. Sparks (1701) ; Wilson v. Ralstall, 4 T. R. 753, 759,
dicta by Buller, J. (1792) ; Broad v. Pitt, 3 C. & P. 518, dicta by Best, C. J.
(1828) ; Best, C. J., claimed the law was settled by a prior case, Reg. v. Gilham, but this case did not raise the question. He placed his reliance then, not
upon a case, but upon dicta. Reg. v. Gilham, Moody Cr. C. 186 (1828).
One of the earliest
'Butler v. Moore, Rolls, Ireland, 24 Feb. (1802).
cases squarely in point, which has been fully reported. There the Roman
Catholic priest objected to testifying as to information secured at a death-bed
confession. Held, that "every man is bound to make discovery unless specially protected by law

. . .

candidly admitted here

. . .

that no special ex-

emption could be shown in this case." Cited Vaillant v. Dodeinond, 2 Atkyns,
524.8
Reg. v. Hay, supra, n. 4. Years later it was said, in a case in which a
vicar was compelled to testify, that it was "not to be supposed for a moment
that a clergyman had the right to withold information from a court of law."
Nortnanshaw v. Normanshaw,69 L. T. N. S. 468 (1893). Even earlier, though,
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gone to the limit. But-the law could not have been settled, for
only seven years before, Baron Alderson considered that the law
favored the privilege and decided against the admissibility of a confidential confession to a minister. He cited no cases, however, and
rendered the decision, it would seem, upon an analogy only.0 As
late as 1890 Coleridge, C. J., told of having argued for the privilege,
but even he had his doubts upon the state of the law; he was mistaken at least, in his belief that the question had never arisen in
Ireland, 10 if not also in his belief concerning the law here discussed.
In the United States we followed, from an early date, what was
apparently the stronger view at common law, that there was no privilege, 1 but this fact seems to have been overlooked by some leading
commentators. 12 The common law cases in the United States are
rare; the reports of recent years reveal but two cases, both of them
from New Jersey; both of these admitted the information secured
by communication to the spiritual adviser. 18 More than half of the
states have protected the privilege by statute. 14 But these statutes
have been construed strictly;1r5 on the face of the decisions such
we find the dicta that the privilege was recognized in Catholic countries, but
"not recognized in England." Anderson v. Bank of British Columbia, L. R.
2 Ch. Div. 644 (1876), 35 L. T. N. S. 76.
'Reg. v. Griffin, 6 Cox C. Cr. 219 (1853). Baron Alderson decided this
case on principle, not authority. He suggested the analogy to the lawyerclient relation; he refused, however, to lay down his decision as "an absolute
rule".
Counsel pressed the point no further.
"0 Life and Correspondence, Vol. II, 364 (1904). A letter from Coleridge,
n. 7, was an Irish case.
Gladstone.
v. Moore,
C. 3.,
to Mr.excused
C Priest
fromButler
testifying,
when supra,
he objected. People v. Phillips, I
West, L. J. (N. Y.) 109 (1813). This case was supported by (it did not cite)
Dicta in Broad v. Pitt, supra, no. 6; dicta in Reg. v. Hay, supra, no. 4; decision in Reg. v. Griffin, supra, n. 9. Minister allowed to testify when he
wished to do so. Sinith's Case, 2 N. Y. City Hall Rec. 77 (1817). This case,
we observe, follows. Broad v. Pitt, supra, n. 6. Reg. v. Gilham, supra, n. 6.
"Wigmore, Evidence, Vol. 5, paragraph 2394 (second edition); Underhill,
Criminal Evidence, paragraph 295 (third edition).
" Information given priest at confessional, held admissable. Bahrey v.
Poniatishin, 112 Atl. 481 (1921 N. J.). Information confidentially given a
Salvation Army major as spiritual adviser, held admissable and "not privileged." State v. Morehouse, 117 Atl. 296 (1922 N. J.)
" California, Colorado, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, Wisconsin. Arizona, Arkansas, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Utah, Washington, Wyoming, Indiana, Kentucky, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Vermont, Porto Rico, Philippine Islands, Alaska.
"Communications must arise under confessional supported by the discipline
of the church. People v. Gates, 13 Wend. (N. Y.) 311 (1835).
Minister must be in his professional capacity. State v. Morgan, 196 Mo.
177, 35 S.W. 402 (1906).
Must be confessions of sin only. Gilhoole, v. State, 58 Ind. 182 (1877)
Hill v. State, 61 Neb. 589, 85 N. W. 836 (19017).

NOTES
strict interpretation implies that the courts, generally, consider that
these statutes have changed the common law and have recognized a
new exception to the general principles of admissibility. This further
supports the view that such confessions were admissible at common
law.
THEORY AND POLICY

The Constitutional Objection
The objection to the statutes usually involves their constitutionality. The Constitution of North Carolina (and of other states)
guarantees the right to worship God "according to the dictates of
their own consciences."16 But the statutes apply alike to the followers of all creeds; they protect no particular religion; they encourage men to go to their ministers, confess their sins, admit
their spiritual bankruptcy, and begin anew to live honestly and honorably; they assure penitents freedom in yielding to their consciences. More than a score of the states have denied the validity of
this constitutional objection, though there is at least subtlety in the
suggestion that ministers should be just as free to yield to their
consciences and notify the police as criminals are to yield to theirs
and confess to ministers. Law finds no difficulty in forbidding doctors and lawyers from committing breaches of confidence; if law
can protect one fiduciary relation, it has power to protect another
by express legislative enactment.

Social Policy
The most forceful objection to the protection of the privilege is
that it throws a veil around the wrongdoer, and that, whether it be
the best policy or not, so long as the theory of our law is that every
wrong should be punished, no obstacle should be placed in the way
of the prosecution of wrongdoers. Confession, "the queen of
proofs," (Enrico Ferri) is certainly "best evidence." Any claim that
the matter is privileged should have the burden of proving its justification, for it may well be argued that public policy is against proConfessor must be a member of the clergyman church. Alford v. Johnson,
103 Ark. 236, 146 S. W. 516 (1912) ; State v. Morgan, supra.
Confession must be-of a private and confidental nature. Milburn v.Haworth, 47 Colorado 593, 108 Pac. 155 (1910).
Of a penitential character, made in obedience to some supposed religious
duty. Knight v. Lee, 80 Ind. 201 (1881).
Not a mere justification of his acts. State v. Brown, 95 Iowa 381, 64 N. W.

277 (1895).

"Wigmore, Evidence, Vol. 5, paragraph 2395 (second edition).
justification for the statutes is shown.

Ample
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tecting a confessed wrongdoer. Ethically, it might be claimed that a
denial of the privilege invites breaches of confidence; the layman
abhors the idea of a minister listening sympathetically to a confession
only to turn upon a confiding penitent, announce his wrong to the
world, and hand him over into the clutches of the law. A Catholic,
firmly wedded to his confessional, and protected in his freedom to
worship God as he pleases, would no doubt revolt at the idea of the
Father Confessor publishing to the world his sins of the month.
But law regards the law of the land as a duty higher than the moral
duty arising out of friendship and sympathy; friends are frequently
called upon to testify against friends and even the bonds of family
kinship are sometimes broken in the vigorous prosecution of those
who have broken the laws of the land.
Sociologically, the privilege might be defended because it tends
to encourage men to yield to their better natures, confess their past
errors, and reform. But sociology is also interested in deterring lawbreaking; if we provide a way by which men may relieve themselves
of the compulsions to confess, a very important factor in the detection of crime will have been destroyed. Psychologically, where the
privilege is protected, this enables the criminal to find release for
suppressed fears and inhibited worries by confessing to a minister.
The minister having given the assurance of divine forgiveness, it
would appear that we would have fewer confessions to the police
and other authorities and, therefore, more of the wrongdoers would
go unpunished, for once the compulsion to confess has found an
outlet, there would be no "drive" operating in the criminal's mind
tending to force him to confess.
The common law cases show considerable conflict, but His Honor,
Judge McRae, was clearly justified in admitting the testimony,
though he could have found ample authority to support a contrary
opinion. The numerous American statutes point to a tendency away
from the "common law" view toward a recognition of the privilege.
D. S. GARDNER.
WHEN

IS A CHECK PAID-LIABILITY OF COLLECTING AGENT

It is universally conceded that a check given in payment of a debt
in the ordinary course of business does not discharge the debt until it
be paid, in the absence of any agreement to the contrary. In a recent
North Carolina case' the plaintiff in suing to enjoin the sale of his
'Litchfield

v. Reid, 195 N. C. 161, 141 S. E. 543 (1928).

